Surveillance
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Last updated on September 12, 2010

Disease Surveillance, Transmission, Latency, Persistence, Incubation

Diseases that are "notifiable" to CDC

Surveillance techniques

Sample size

List of Notifiable Diseases

The list of nationally notifiable diseases is revised periodically. For example, a disease might be added to the list as a new pathogen emerges, or a disease might be deleted as its incidence declines. Public health officials at state health departments and CDC continue to collaborate in determining which diseases should be nationally notifiable. The Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), with input from CDC, makes recommendations annually for additions and deletions. Although disease reporting is mandated (i.e., by legislation or regulation) at the state and local levels, state reporting to CDC is voluntary. Thus, the list of diseases considered notifiable varies slightly by state. All states generally report the internationally quarantinable diseases (i.e., cholera, plague, and yellow fever) in compliance with the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations.

Infectious Diseases Designated as Notifiable at the National Level During 2008

(from the CDC web site http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5754a1.htm)

  • Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
  • Anthrax
  • California serogroup virus
  • Eastern equine encephalitis virus
  • Powassan virus
  • St. Louis encephalitis virus
  • West Nile virus: 45 states and DC
  • Western equine encephalitis virus
  • Botulism
  • Brucellosis: BSL-3 practices for lab isolates; 49 states are brucellosis-free. B. abortus still exists in Yellowstone, and B. suis is enzootic in wild pigs in the Southeast.
  • Chancroid
  • Chlamydia trachomatis infections
  • Cholera
  • Coccidioidomycosis
  • Cryptosporidiosis: usually from contaminated swimming pool water
  • Cyclosporiasis
  • Diphtheria
  • Ehrlichiosis/Anaplasmosis
  • Ehrlichia chaffeensis
  • Ehrlichia ewingii
  • Anaplasma phagocytophilum
  • Giardiasis
  • Gonorrhea
  • Haemophilus influenzae, invasive disease
  • Hansen disease (Leprosy)
  • Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome: Bunya virus in Asia, Japan and Eurasia; variants producing a less serious form (nephropathia endemica) in Scandinavia, Europe and what was formerly the USSR. Numerous cases have occurred in lab animal personnel handling rodents. Transmission by inhalation. Nephropathia endemica: fever, severe back pain, nephritis, with recovery. HPS: fever, thrombocytopenia and leukocytosis, proceeding rapidly to respiratory failure from capillary leakage, shock and cardiac complications and DIC.{4780}
  • Hemolytic uremic syndrome, post-diarrheal (caused by shiga toxin-producing E. coli)
  • Hepatitis A, acute: humans are the natural reservoir for all hepatitis viruses; 100 cases were associated with imported chimps, and many other NHPs can be infected. Human vaccine available.{4780}
  • Hepatitis B: studied in chimps. Other hepadnaviruses of animals (woodchuck, duck, ground squirrel) not transmissible to humans.{4780}
  • Hepatitis C: chimps have been used to model disease.{4780}
  • Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection: chimps are thought to be the original source for HIV-1, and sooty mangabeys for HIV-2.{4780}
  • Influenza-associated pediatric mortality
  • Legionellosis
  • Listeriosis: usually in old people; from deli meat and unpasteurized cheese
  • Lyme disease
  • Malaria
  • Measles: most US cases (n=127) are imported, many from the WHO European region. Disease usually subclinical in OWM but there is high mortality in NWM from diarrhea.{4780}
  • Meningococcal disease
  • Mumps: declined due to vaccine introduced in 1967, but there was an outbreak in 2006 with >6,000 cases
  • Novel influenza A virus infections
  • Pertussis
  • Plague
  • Poliomyelitis
  • Psittacosis: Many species of Chlamydophila, but only C. psittaci is a frequent cause of zoonosis. C. trachomatis is not transmissible to animals.
  • Q fever: considered enzootic in ruminants; believed to be under-reported because of nonspecific presentation. Highly infectious, spores persist in environment. Human disease is flu-like resolving in 2 weeks; but in some cases hepatitis, nephritis, epicarditis and endocarditis. Serologic status of sheep is not a useful indicator of shedding status. Vaccine available from USAMRIID.{4780}
  • Rabies: 2 cases, one import from Mexico and one bat rabies in Missouri. 6,841 animal rabies cases in US, mostly in wildlife. Cats are the most frequently-reported domestic animal with rabies.
  • Rocky Mountain spotted fever
  • Rubella
  • Salmonellosis: mostly in children <5 years old
  • Severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) disease
  • Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC): cattle are the reservoir, contaminating food and water.
  • Shigellosis: usually a day-care disease
  • Smallpox
  • Streptococcal disease, invasive, Group A
  • Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome
  • Streptococcus pneumoniae
  • Syphilis
  • Tetanus
  • Toxic-shock syndrome (other than streptococcal)
  • Trichinellosis: outbreak in Californians who ate bear meat
  • Tuberculosis
  • Tularemia
  • Typhoid fever
  • Vancomycin-intermediate Staphylococcus aureus infection (VISA)
  • Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection (VRSA)
  • Varicella
  • Vibriosis
  • Yellow fever: Yellow fever and Dengue are both mosquito-borne flaviviruses. Yellow fever is in African and South American jungles, while Dengue is endemic in tropical Asia, Africa, Oceania, Australia and the Americas. African monkeys get subclinical disease, but New World monkeys and man get fulminating disease: fever, vomiting, anorexia, yellow-green urine, icterus and albuminuria. Gross lesions: classic lesion is massive midzonal necrotizing hepatitis; hepatocytes contain Councilman bodies (eosinophilic intracytoplasmic inclusions).{4780}

Note: some diseases that veterinarians know are "reportable" are not included on this list, i.e. monkeypox. This is covered in the import regulations for NHPs. Reportable diseases are a state-sponsored function, not CDC.

Surveillance Techniques

There is disagreement over how quarantined animals should be housed. A Special Topic Review by Rehg and Toth {3965} summarized their institution’s quarantine procedures for rodents, particularly mice. Quarantined rodents should be kept in a separate physical facility from the resident animals, ideally. If this is not possible they should be kept in an area under negative pressure, or in flexible film isolators. Durfee et al claimed that animals from approved vendors could be accepted directly into the resident colony as long as periodic monitoring is done to pick up any unsuspected organisms.{3700} On the other hand, Hessler et al believe that rodent quarantine should be conducted under BSL-3-like conditions, including separate ventilation system, double doors, and autoclaving materials into and out of the facility. Alternatively, Hessler suggests that separate rooms with ventilated caging and microisolators can be used.{3741} Small agreed that animals from reputable vendors could be placed directly into the room in which the experiment is to take place, claiming that a passive quarantine of 4-6 weeks allows non-persistent murine viruses such as RCV/SDAV and Sendai virus to run their course. In an active quarantine in which animals are presumed to be contaminated (i.e. if the vendor is suspect or the animals come from non-traditional sources), they should be housed in plastic Trexler isolators, Illinois cubicles, or Horsfall-Bauer units and tested serologically.{3956}

If the experimental rodents cannot be used for testing (because they are fragile, immunocompromised or institutional policy prohibits it), sentinel animals must be substituted. These may be of the same source population as the experimental animals, or they may be of a different strain and coat color to distinguish them from the experimental animals. There is general agreement that mice of susceptible strains and varying ages should be used in quarantine programs. Females are most often used because they fight less and will not cause pregnancy if cohabited with other animals, but sex predilection should be kept in mind.{3956}{3965} Sentinels can be exposed purposely to the other animals by cohabitation, or by purposely contaminating their bedding with that of other animals. For bedding contamination to work, the organism of interest must be shed in the feces, be stable in feces, and be of sufficient numbers to infect the sentinels.{3965}

Genetically susceptible rodent strains
Pathogen    Susceptible strain
Clostridium piliforme    BB, LE, SHR, Sprague-Dawley rats; ICR mice
Salmonella    worse in BALB/C, C57BL mice
Streptobacillus moniliformis    worse in C57BL/6J mice
Mycoplasma pulmonis    worse in ddY mice; LEW rats
Ectromelia    worse in A, CBA, DBA, C3H, BALB/c mice
Lactate dehydrogenase virus    AKR, C58 mice are paralyzed
MHV    worse in BALB/C, C57BL mice
Sendai virus    Kills DBA/2J and 129/J mice
Theiler’s mouse encephalomyelitis    worse in CD-1 (NMRI), DBA/2, SJL, SWR mice
 

Well-kept records are essential to any QA program. A pattern may be seen to emerge when deaths occur that are not associated with experimentation. Clinical records should be maintained for rodent rooms in the same way that individual records are kept for some larger species. Charts depicting the arrangement of animal room racks may help in tracking the infected animal’s proximity to others in the room. In addition, floor plans may be used to indicate the flow of supplies, people, water and air to help pinpoint management problems.{3956}

A different method of finding infectious organisms in animal rooms is to use PCR on environmental surfaces. Room air filters, for example, may be a good source of parvoviruses, which remain in the environment for at least 6 months.{4026}

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Sample size

The question of the right number of animals to sample is challenging because it is always too high to be deemed affordable. The correct prevalence of the disease of interest is also problematic, because the goal is zero and most vendors (and possibly institutions) claim that that is the correct prevalence in their colonies.

This table may be used to help determine the number of animals to be sampled. It predicts the number of animals required to detect a single case of disease in a population of ³ 100 animals. The acceptable confidence limits and the assumed percentage of infected animals present must both be known.{3956} If, for example, the assumed prevalence of the disease in the population is only 1%, testing 200 animals will only yield an 87% confidence of picking up the disease. Most authors seem to accept that testing 5-10 animals in the population will detect a disease if the prevalence is as high as 30%. The table and the formula were first published in 1976{3966} and were based on personal communication.

Probability of Detecting Infection in a Sample of Animals

Confidence limits are tabulated for assumed infection rate in top row

Sample size 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50%
5 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.41 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.92 0.97
10 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.65 0.80 0.89 0.94 0.97 0.99  
15 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.46 0.54 0.79 0.91 0.95 0.99      
20 0.18 0.33 0.46 0.56 0.64 0.88 0.95 0.99        
25 0.22 0.40 0.53 0.64 0.72 0.93 0.98          
30 0.25 0.45 0.60 0.71 0.79 0.96 0.99          
35 0.30 0.51 0.66 0.76 0.83 0.97            
40 0.33 0.55 0.70 0.80 0.87 0.99            
45 0.36 0.69 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.99            
50 0.39 0.64 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.99            
60 0.45 0.70 0.84 0.91 0.95              
70 0.51 0.76 0.88 0.94 0.97              
80 0.55 0.80 0.91 0.96 0.98              
90 0.60 0.84 0.94 0.97 0.99              
100 0.63 0.87 0.95 0.98 0.99              
120 0.70 0.91 0.97 0.99                
140 0.76 0.94 0.99                  
160 0.80 0.96 0.99                  
180 0.84 0.97                    
200 0.87 0.98                    
N= log (1-probability of detecting infection)
          log (1-assumed % infection rate)

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©1999, Janet Becker Rodgers, DVM, MS, DipACLAM, MRCVS

All rights reserved.

Comments? Send an email to janet.rodgers@vet.ox.ac.uk